> You're mis-representing my examples by shifting the context,
Specific example of where I did this?
> literally gives the same examples to two of the main ones I mentioned at the very top of the article as key examples of security through obscurity: "Examples of this practice include disguising sensitive information within commonplace items, like a piece of paper in a book, or altering digital footprints, such as spoofing a web browser's version number"
I mean, I don't disagree that what you said about changing port numbers, for example, is security through obscurity. My point is that this is not any kind of defense from a capable and motivated attacker. Other examples like the OpenBSD mitigation you mentioned are very obviously not security through obscurity though.
> If you're not understanding how memory allocation randomization is security through obscurity- you are not understanding what the concept entails at the core.
No, you still don't understand what 'security through obscurity' means. If I use an open asymmetric key algorithm - the fact that I can't guess a private key does not make it 'security through obscurity' it's the obscuring of the actual crypto algorithm that would make it 'security through obscurity'. Completely open security mitigations like the one you mentioned have nothing to do with security through obscurity.
> The flaw in your firewall example is not using obscurity itself, but: (1) not also using traditional methods of hardening on top of it
Sooo... you think adding more obscurity on top of a closed, insecure piece of software is going to make it secure?
> if an external person could infer what software you are using by interacting remotely,
There are soooo many ways for a capable and motivated attacker to figure out what software you're running. Trying to obscure that fact is not any kind of security mitigation whatsoever. Especially when you're dealing with completely closed software/hardware - all of your attempts at concealment are mostly moot - you have no idea what kind of signatures/signals that closed system exposes, you have no idea what backdoors exist, you have no idea what kind of vulnerable dependencies it has that expose their own signatures and have their own backdoors. Your suggestion is really laughable.
> not also using traditional methods of hardening on top of it
What 'traditional methods' do you use to 'harden' closed software/hardware? You literally have no idea what security holes and backdoors exist.
> if an external person could infer what software you are using by interacting remotely, and then obtain their own commercial copy to investigate for flaws.
Uhh yeah, now you're literally bringing up one of the most common arguments for why security through obscurity is bullshit. During WW1/WW2 security through obscurity was common in crypto - they relied on hiding their crypto algos instead of designing ones that would be secure even when publicly known. What happened is enough messages, crypto machines, etc were recovered by the other side to reverse these obscured algos and break them - since then crypro has pretty much entirely moved away from security through obscurity.
You are operating on a false dichotomy that the current best practices of cryptographic security, code auditing, etc. are somehow mutually exclusive with obscurity, and then arguing against obscurity by arguing for other good practices. They are absolutely complementary, and implementing a real world secure system will layer both- one starts with a mathematically secure heavily publicly audited system, and adds obscurity in their real world deployment of it.
If there are advantages to a closed source system, it is not in situations where the source is closed to you and contains bugs, but when closed to the attacker. If you have the resources and ability to, for example, develop your own internally used but externally unknown, but still heavily audited and cryptographically secure system, is going to be better than an open source tool.
> They are absolutely complementary, and implementing a real world secure system will layer both- one starts with a mathematically secure heavily publicly audited system, and adds obscurity in their real world deployment of it.
Ok, let's start with a 'mathematically secure heavily public audited system' - let's take ECDSA, for example - how will you use obscurity to improve security?
> If you have the resources and ability to, for example, develop your own internally used but externally unknown, but still heavily audited and cryptographically secure system, is going to be better than an open source tool.
Literally all of the evidence we have throughout the history of the planet says you're 100% wrong.
> Literally all of the evidence we have throughout the history of the planet says you're 100% wrong
You are so sure you’re right that you are not really thinking about what I am saying, and how it applies to real world situations- especially things like real life high stakes life or death situations.
I am satisfied that your perspective makes the most sense for low stakes broad deployments like software releases, but not for one off high stakes systems.
For things like ECDSA, like anything else you implement obscurity on a one off basis tailored to the specific use case- know your opponent and make them think you are using an entirely different method and protocol that they’ve already figured out and compromised. Hide the actual channel of communication so they are unable to notice it exists, and over that you simply use ECDSA properly.
Oh, and store your real private key in the geometric design of a giant mural in your living room, while your house and computers are littered with thousands of wrong private keys on ancient media that is expensive to extract. Subscribe to and own every key wallet product or device, but actually use none of them.
> You are so sure you’re right that you are not really thinking about what I am saying, and how it applies to real world situations- especially things like real life high stakes life or death situations.
Nah, you're just saying a lot of stuff that's factually incorrect and just terrible advice overall. You lack understanding what you're talking about. And the stakes are pretty irrelevant to whether a system is secure or not.
> For things like ECDSA, like anything else you implement obscurity on a one off basis tailored to the specific use case- know your opponent and make them think you are using an entirely different method and protocol that they’ve already figured out and compromised.
You're going to make ECDSA more secure by making people think you're not using ECDSA? That makes so little sense in so many ways. Ahahahahaha.
I very well may be wrong, but if so you are not aware of how, and I will need to find someone else to explain it to me. I’ve been interested for a while in having a serious debate with someone that understands and advocates for the position you claim to have- but if you understood it you would be able to meaningfully defend it rather than using dismissive statements.
Specific example of where I did this?
> literally gives the same examples to two of the main ones I mentioned at the very top of the article as key examples of security through obscurity: "Examples of this practice include disguising sensitive information within commonplace items, like a piece of paper in a book, or altering digital footprints, such as spoofing a web browser's version number"
I mean, I don't disagree that what you said about changing port numbers, for example, is security through obscurity. My point is that this is not any kind of defense from a capable and motivated attacker. Other examples like the OpenBSD mitigation you mentioned are very obviously not security through obscurity though.
> If you're not understanding how memory allocation randomization is security through obscurity- you are not understanding what the concept entails at the core.
No, you still don't understand what 'security through obscurity' means. If I use an open asymmetric key algorithm - the fact that I can't guess a private key does not make it 'security through obscurity' it's the obscuring of the actual crypto algorithm that would make it 'security through obscurity'. Completely open security mitigations like the one you mentioned have nothing to do with security through obscurity.
> The flaw in your firewall example is not using obscurity itself, but: (1) not also using traditional methods of hardening on top of it
Sooo... you think adding more obscurity on top of a closed, insecure piece of software is going to make it secure?
> if an external person could infer what software you are using by interacting remotely,
There are soooo many ways for a capable and motivated attacker to figure out what software you're running. Trying to obscure that fact is not any kind of security mitigation whatsoever. Especially when you're dealing with completely closed software/hardware - all of your attempts at concealment are mostly moot - you have no idea what kind of signatures/signals that closed system exposes, you have no idea what backdoors exist, you have no idea what kind of vulnerable dependencies it has that expose their own signatures and have their own backdoors. Your suggestion is really laughable.
> not also using traditional methods of hardening on top of it
What 'traditional methods' do you use to 'harden' closed software/hardware? You literally have no idea what security holes and backdoors exist.
> if an external person could infer what software you are using by interacting remotely, and then obtain their own commercial copy to investigate for flaws.
Uhh yeah, now you're literally bringing up one of the most common arguments for why security through obscurity is bullshit. During WW1/WW2 security through obscurity was common in crypto - they relied on hiding their crypto algos instead of designing ones that would be secure even when publicly known. What happened is enough messages, crypto machines, etc were recovered by the other side to reverse these obscured algos and break them - since then crypro has pretty much entirely moved away from security through obscurity.